The Appointments Clause And International
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A False
Conflict by Davey, Wiliam J.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 4 Article 8
Fall 9-1-1992
The Appointments Clause And International
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A False Conflict
Wiliam J. Davey
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the International
Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wiliam J. Davey, The Appointments Clause And International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: A False
Conflict, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1315 (1992), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol49/
iss4/8
THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS: A FALSE
CONFLICT
WILLIAM J. DAVEY*
The Appointments Clause' requires that the President and the Senate
each have a role in the selection of senior federal officials. As such, it is
an example of the checks and balances that characterizes the U.S. political
system in which there is a separation of powers between the various branches
of government. The Appointments Clause need not and should not be
interpreted to impinge on the power of the United States as a nation to
conduct a modern foreign trade policy.
In this comment on Mr. Morrison's article,2 I wish to make essentially
three points: First, the dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 19 of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement3 (FTA) do not violate even a
strict reading of the Appointments Clause. Second, if a court deemed the
constitutionality of the Chapter 19 procedures to be a close question under
the Appointments Clause, there is .ample precedent for finding them to be
constitutional because of their connection with foreign affairs, where the
Supreme Court has traditionally been less concerned with separation of
powers issues. Finally, upholding these provisions is consistent with and
reinforces representative democracy.
I. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND CHAPTER 19 OF THE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT
Chapter 19 of the FTA permits a Canadian or U.S. person involved in
an antidumping (AD) or countervailing duty (CVD) investigation to chal-
lenge a final decision therein by the Commerce Department or the Inter-
national Trade Commission (or by the comparable Canadian authorities)
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974,
Michigan.
I. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause provides:
[The President] . .. shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law;
but the Congress may by Law vest Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
Id.
2. Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Pro-
visions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299
(1992).
3. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., ch. 19, 27 I.L.M. 293, 386
[hereinafter FTA].
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before a binational panel. 4 Binational panels are composed of five indivi-
duals: two from the United States, two from Canada, with the fifth from
one or the other. 5 The first two U.S. members are normally selected by the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) from a previously established
roster of potential candidates, subject to a Canadian right to object to four
proposed panel members. The first two Canadian members are analogously
chosen. The fifth person is selected by agreement of the USTR and her
Canadian counterpart.
6
The panel so selected hears the parties' arguments in the case and
decides, based upon the administrative record, whether the challenged
determination by the relevant administrative agency was "in accordance
with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing [coun-
try]." 7 The panel's review is intended to replace judicial review of such
determinations by U.S. or Canadian courts.8 Its decision is final and
nonappealable. 9
In his article, Mr. Morrison argues two points: 1) the panel members
"exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States"
and therefore under Supreme Court precedent must be appointed in accor-
dance with the Appointments Clause;10 and 2) the panelists are not "infe-
rior" officers under the Morrison v. Olson" criteria established by the
Court and accordingly they must all be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. Even accepting these standards arguendo, Chapter
19's procedures do not violate them.
A. Panels Exercise Authority Pursuant to the FTA, Not U.S. Law
Chapter 19 panels do not "exercisfe] significant authority pursuant to
the law of the United States." The panel's authority derives exclusively
from the Free Trade Agreement itself. It is the FTA, and not U.S. law,
that provides when and how panels are to be established, what their
4. Id. art. 1904, at 387-90.
5. Id. annex 1901.2(2), (3), at 393.
6. Id. art. 1904, annex 1901.2(3), 387-90, 393. In the absence of such agreement, that
person may be selected by the first four panelists chosen, or, if they are unable to agree, by
lottery.
7. Id. art. 1904(2), at 387.
8. Id. art. 1904(1), at 387.
9. See id. art. 1904(9), (11), at 388. However, the decision can be "appealed" to an
extraordinary challenge committee, but only on very limited grounds (misbehavior by a panelist,
the panel's failure to follow a fundamental rule of procedure or on the grounds that the panel
manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction under the FTA). See id. art. 1904(13),
annex 1904.13, at 388-89, 395. The only such challenge to date confirms that the grounds for
appeal are very limited. In re Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. ECC-
91-1904-01 USA, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 7, 1991 WL 153112 (Extraordinary Challenge Committee
June 14, 1991).
10. Morrison, supra note 2, at 1302-03 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126
(1976)).
11. 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988).
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functions are, what standard of review they are to apply, the time limits
within which they are to complete their tasks and so on. 12 This conclusion
is buttressed by a Ninth Circuit case, in which the court ruled that, for
purposes of the Appointments Clause, members of a council created by an
interstate compact were acting pursuant to the compact, not the federal
statute approving the compact, and accordingly were not officers of the
United States. 3 The court reached this conclusion even though the federal
statute "constrains Council policy-making, ... and subjects some Council
operations to federal law."'
' 4
In contrast, the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act of 1988 (the Implementation Act),' 5 which is the only U.S.
law dealing with the FTA, has no provisions dealing directly with panels.
The Implementation Act's interaction with Chapter 19 is limited to title IV
of the Act. First, it amends U.S. law so that when a proper request pursuant
to Chapter 19 is filed, the normally applicable provisions of U.S. law
concerning judicial review of AD/CVD cases do piot apply. 6 These provi-
sions have nothing to say about how panels are to operate, what law
panelists are supposed to apply and so on.
Second, the Implementation Act specifies how the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) is to select the list of U.S. persons eligible to serve
on panels.' 7 The establishment of this list is merely a preparatory step.
Under the Act, no duties or standards of conduct are imposed on the
persons selected for inclusion on the list, no functions. are specified for
them and no powers are granted to them. Inclusion on the list does not
guarantee that the persons named will in fact ever serve on a panel. It
merely establishes a list (required by the FTA) from which panel members
may be selected. Again, in these provisions, the Act says nothing about
how panels are to be established, except to provide that the USTR is to
exercise the U.S. Government's selection powers under the FTA.1's
In short, the Implementation Act says nothing at all about, the juris-
diction of the panels, their functions and so on. Thus, it cannot be said
that the panels are "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of
the United States." Their authority derives from the FTA.
Two additional points should be noted. First, the fact that the panels
interpret U.S. law, if indeed they do that, does not mean that they exercise
12. See FTA, supra note 3, arts. 1904, 1909, 1910, annexes 1901.2, 1903.2, 1904.13, at
387-90, 391, 391, 393-94, 394-95, 395.
13. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
14. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 19, 28
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Implementation Act].
16. See Implementation Act §§ 401-403, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a), (f), (b), 28 U.S.C. 2643(c),
1583, 19 U.S.C. 1502(b), 1514(b), 1677f, 1677 (1988). Similar conforming amendments were
made in respect of liquidation of entries and protective orders and other such matters.
17. Implementation Act § 405, 102 Stat. at 1888-92.
18. Implementation Act § 405(a), 102 Stat. at 1888-92.
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authority pursuant to U.S. law. Second, the fact that the United States has
committed itself to follow the decisions of the panels does not mean that
the panel decisions are binding in the sense that the decision of a U.S.
court would be binding.
1. Interpretation of U.S. Law
The fact that a person interprets existing U.S. law and court decisions
does not make that person an officer of the United States. Otherwise,
foreign judges interpreting U.S. law, arbitrators and so forth would be
officers of the United States and I think that no one would argue that they
are. The fact that panel members, and arbitrators, etc., exercise one function
of federal judges does not in any sense make them federal judges. In
addition, as noted below, panel decisions are not binding in the sense that
U.S. court decisions are.
Moreover, it is arguable that in reviewing U.S. cases, panels do not
even apply U.S. law per se. Article 1904(2) of the FTA explicitly incorporates
the U.S. AD/CVD laws into the agreement for purposes of panel review. 9
Thus, the panels are arguably interpreting the FTA, not U.S. law. Because
the panels follow procedures established under the FTA in deciding proce-
dural matters, they are not bound at all by U.S. law. Thus, to say that
they are simply doing what a U.S. court would do is inaccurate. While the
distinction between following U.S. law and international law which incor-
porates U.S. law may seem to be a fine one, it is a clear one and an
important one.
2. The Binding Nature of Panel Decisions
Under Chapter 19, the decisions issued by panels are in reality only
advisory, which suggests that the panels are not exercising power pursuant
to U.S. law. While it is true that the United States has agreed to abide by
the rulings, it cannot be compelled to. To put it another way, a prevailing
party in a panel decision could not get an enforceable order from the panel
or a U.S. court that would direct the Commerce Department or the
International Trade Decision to implement the panel ruling. 20 Obviously, a
19. FTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(2), at 387.
20. Section 401(c) of the Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7) (1988)) requires
the appropriate administrative agency to take action not inconsistent with the decision of a
panel. However, it also provides that any action taken by an agency "under this paragraph
shall not be subject to judicial review, and no court of the United States shall have power or
jurisdiction to review such action on any questions of law or fact by an action in the nature
of mandamus or otherwise." Implementation Act § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(7)(A) (1988).
Thus, an agency's decision to ignore a panel decision and implement its rejected prior decision
could not be challenged. This point is driven home by section 102(c)(2) of the Act, which
provides that "No person other than the United States shall ... challenge, in any action
brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, or
other instrumentality of the United States ... on the ground that such action or inaction is
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decision by those agencies to ignore the U.S. commitment might lead to a
denunciation of the FTA by Canada, but that does not change the funda-
mental power relationships. The panels, and those favored by their decisions,
in the end cannot make the United States do anything. As such, it cannot
be said that the panels exercise significant authority pursuant to U.S. law.
Consequently, in doing their job, the panels are not exercising authority
pursuant to U.S. law. They are exercising authority under an international
agreement negotiated by the President and approved by both Houses of
Congress.
2'
B. U.S. Panel Roster Members Are "Inferior" Officers
There is, of course, a U.S. law connection with the panelists in that
the U.S. panel members are appointed pursuant to the Implementation Act.
It could be argued accordingly that even if the panel is applying an
international agreement, the individual panelists are applying that agreement
pursuant to the laws of the United States or Canada, depending on their
nationality, because their membership on the panel derives ultimately from
procedures established by the Implementation Act for the establishment of
the roster of potential panelists or the analogous Canadian legislation.
If this argument were accepted, the issue would then become whether
the U.S. roster of potential panelists and U.S. panel members are named
in accordance with the Appointments Clause. Because the Canadian panel
members would be exercising their authority pursuant to the laws of Canada,
there would be no Appointments Clause issue with respect to them. As to
the U.S. members of the roster and panels, since they are not appointed
by the President, the question would be whether they are inferior officers
inconsistent with the Agreement." Id. § 102(c)(2), 102 Stat. 1853. In this connection, however,
in Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Inv. No. 701-TA-298 (Final) (ITC Pub. 2362,
Feb. 1991), the members of the International Trade Commission whose decision had been
reversed by a binational panel accepted that they were bound by the panel's decision, even
though they vigorously expressed their belief that the panel's decision violated the applicable
provisions of the FTA.
It is worth noting that Congress provided in the first-described provision, that if it were
declared unconstitutional, then the President would be authorized to accept panel decisions on
behalf of the United States. Id. § 401(c), 19 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(7)(B) (1988). This procedure also
underscores the fact that the panel's decisions are not directly applicable in the United States.
21. It is important to stress that in establishing this system, Congress has not transferred
federal powers to an international agency. There is no inherent right to have federal courts
review the decisions of the administrative agencies in AD/CVD cases. Accordingly, there is
no problem in Congress giving review powers to an international body. See COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Tin ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF Tm CITY OF NEw YORK, THE UNITED
STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: BINATIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR ANTIDUMPING
AN COUNTERVAMING DUTY CASES, 21-32 (Apr. 25, 1988), reprinted in United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 621, 664-
55 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (author, adjunct member of committee, participated in drafting
report).
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under the Constitution and whether the standards for appointment of
inferior officers have been met.
1. Roster Members as Inferior Officers
Are the U.S. panel roster members or U.S. panel members inferior
officers? As a past member of the U.S. roster and two Chapter 19 panels,
I must say at the outset that it never occurred to me that I held such an
august position that it should require U.S. Senate confirmation. Thus, it is
hard for me to think of a panel member, let alone a roster member, as an
officer of the United States. Not surprisingly, I think that the case law
cited in Mr. Morrison's article supports rather than refutes my position. 2
In Morrison v. Olson,2 the Supreme Court concluded that a special
prosecutor was an inferior officer for four reasons. While the Court did
not suggest that all four criteria had to be met for someone to be an inferior
officer, U.S. roster members meet all four.
First, the Court noted that a special prosecutor was subject to removal
by a cabinet officer. 24 This is effectively the case for U.S. roster members.
The USTR, on an annual basis, is authorized to "select" the U.S. roster
of potential panelists. She has complete discretion to decide not to reap-
point.25 The Implementation Act does not explicitly grant power to the
USTR to remove persons from the roster; it is aimed principally at pre-
venting the selection of persons who have not been discussed with specified
committees of Congress. 26 It has long been recognized, however, that "Itihe
power to remove ... is an incident of the power to appoint."'- 7
The terms of the FTA, which Congress approved in the Act, support
this conclusion. The FTA provides that each party shall select twenty-five
roster members in consultation with each other and that the parties may
amend the roster, again after consultations. 2s Since each party is responsible
for its own list of roster members, the power to amend the list, which is
reserved to the parties, effectively means that the USTR can remove U.S.
roster members from the roster.29
22. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1302-07.
23. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988).
24. Id. at 671.
25. See Implementation Act § 405, 102 Stat. at 1888-92.
26. Id. at § 405(a)(7)(A), 102 Stat. 1891-92.
27. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926).
28. FTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(1), at 393 ("The Parties shall consult in developing
the roster, which shall include 50 candidates .... The Parties ... may amend [the roster],
when necessary, after consultations").
29. Even if the USTR were found not have the power of removal, she has the practical
power to prevent the appointment to a panel of a potential U.S. panelist on the roster since
she chooses the two U.S. members of the panel and must agree to the choice of the fifth
U.S.-Canadian member. Only if the U.S. and Canadian representatives could not agree on a
fifth panelist, if the person was not disqualified by the Canadians and if the person was
chosen by the other panelists or by lottery, a situation which has never occurred, could a U.S.
person be chosen to serve on a panel without the concurrence of the USTR. Thus, she can
effectively preclude appointment to panels, which is basically the same as having the power
to remove a person from the roster of potential panelists.
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Because U.S. panelists become roster members pursuant to U.S. law, it
is the ability to remove them from the roster that is the key to whether the
first Morrison v. Olson criterion is met. It is worth noting, however, that
a panelist, once appointed, may be removed from a panel by the parties if
they conclude that the panelist is violating the code of conduct for panelists.
30
The second criterion cited by Morrison v. Olson was that an inferior
officer perform limited duties.' In that case the Court found that a special
prosecutor met this test, and so would a member of the roster. Unless
appointed to a panel, a roster member has no duties. If appointed, the
panel member's duties are limited to consideration of one case, a much
more limited charge than that given to a special prosecutor. The third
criterion-limited jurisdiction 32-is met for the same reasons. And so is the
fourth-temporary appointment.3 3 Rosters are named for one year; panel
service is typically for less than one year.
34
Thus, if panelists are officers of the United States, they are inferior
officers. This comports with common'sense. The list of presidential ap-
pointees subject to Senate confirmation generally includes positions of far
greater importance than that of a roster member or panelist.3s
2. Appointment by Head of Department
As to the other criterion of the Appointments Clause-the requirement
that inferior officers be appointed by a head of department-it seems clear
that a cabinet level official, such as the USTR, qualifies as a department
head, even if her department is not among the largest in the government.
Consequently, the U.S. panel members are appointed in conformity
with the Appointments Clause requirements for inferior officers. The Ca-
nadian members are, of course, appointed in conformity with Canadian
30. FTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(b), at 393. The Code of Conduct can be found in
54 Fed. Reg. 14,371 (1989). The Morrison v. Olson removal test would be met by the power
to remove someone for cause, i.e., if that person violates the applicable code of conduct. The
special prosecutor at issue in Morrison v. Olson could be removed "only for good cause,
physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantial impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties." 487 U.S. at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
596(a)(1) (1988)). In addition, under the relevant statute, an independent counsel had a right
to seek judicial review of his removal. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the special
prosecutor was "subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official." 487 U.S. at 671.
31. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
32. Id. at 672.
33. Id.
34. See FTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(14), at 389 (requiring panel decision within 315
days of request for panel review).
35. The one initially troubling argument raised by Mr. Morrison is that the panelists
could not be inferior officers because they can overrule decisions by "senior" officers since
AD/CVD decisions are typically made by Presidential appointees confirmed by the Senate.
See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1302. But this is not really true. As noted above, because the
panel decisions are ultimately only advisory, the "senior" officers are not really overruled by
panels, but by a tacit decision of the President or other higher officials not to reject the
panel's decision.
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law. U.S. law has no relevance to their position on the roster or panels.
In conclusion, the panels are creatures of international law-the FTA.
While U.S. participation in the process is the result of the Implementation
Act, the panels are not. U.S. law deals only with the process by which the
United States selects its roster of potential panelists. The panels themselves
do not exercise authority pursuant to the laws of the United States; they
exercise authority pursuant to the FTA. To the extent that it can be argued
that the U.S. panel members exercise authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States, they do so only in relation to their selection to the panel
roster pursuant to the Implementation Act. There is no Appointments Clause
problem, however, because the U.S. panel roster is selected in accordance
with the Clause's procedures for the appointment of inferior officers of the
United States; they are chosen by a cabinet officer after consultation with
Congress.
It is important that Congress did not try to appropriate power to itself
in connection with the Implementation Act and the selection of the U.S.
members of the panel roster. While it may be true that the lack of
congressional aggrandizement is not definitive in Appointments Clause ju-
risprudence, 6 it is very important, especially from a policy perspective. The
Appointments Clause was designed to regulate the appointments power as
between the executive and the legislative branches. It was viewed that there
were three choices-give the power to the executive, give it to the legislative
or make them share it. Thus, the Appointments Clause was part of the
checks and balances system inherent in our separation of powers.17 No one
was urging its inclusion in the Constitution as a way to prevent the executive
and the legislative branches from taking united action to conduct U.S.
foreign policy effectively, or to conclude a free trade agreement with
Canada.
II. Ti APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRs
A constitutional provision that is designed to regulate the relative powers
of the executive and legislative branches should not be interpreted to impede
the ability of the United States to engage in normal commercial relations
with other countries for two reasons. First, international trade agreements
with effective dispute settlement mechanisms are becoming more and the
more the norm in international relations. Second, Supreme Court precedent
supports the proposition that foreign affairs issues merit special, deferential
treatment by courts.
38
A. The Spread of International Trade Agreements and the Need for
Effective Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The FTA is a type of agreement between countries that is becoming
ever more important and common. Indeed, the United States has just
36. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687-91 (1988).
37. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129-32.




negotiated a similar agreement with Mexico and Canada. 39 Many such
agreements have been negotiated in recent years." While some are not as
detailed or far reaching as the FTA, some are more comprehensive, such
as the agreement creating the European Community.4' At the same time,
the scope of the basic international agreement on trade, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 42 has greatly expanded and will expand
even further if its so-called Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions is brought to a successful conclusion.
43
A fundamental part of any serious international trade agreement is an
effective dispute settlement procedure.44 In order to be effective, that pro-
cedure must be able to determine whether acts of a government violate the
agreement and provide for a mechanism for enforcing those determinations;
otherwise, the commitments made in the agreement will be meaningless.
4
Some trade disputes will involve the compatibility of a specific national
legal provision with a trade agreement; other disputes will involve the
compatibility with a trade agreement of- administrative agency decisions
based on national legal provisions that may on their face appear compatible
with the agreement. An effective dispute settlement mechanism must be able
to rule whether the challenged law or administrative decision violates the
agreement. It must also be perceived to be a fair, neutral mechanism if its
rulings are to be accepted. A requirement that all panel members be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate would compromise
the neutrality and fairness of the mechanism. Such a requirement would
also undoubtedly be totally unacceptable to foreign governments.
Full U.S. participation in the world economy requires that the United
States be able to enter into agreements with effective dispute settlement
39. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available
in LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database; WL, NAFTA Database (awaiting ratification as this
article went to press); 57 Fed. Reg. 43,603 (1992) (discussing NAFTA).
40. See AuGusTo DE LA ToRn & MARGARET R. KELLY, REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGE-
MENTS, tables 1-4, at 8-9, 11-12 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 93, 1992).
41. For a survey of the scope of the European Community, see GEORGE BERMANN ET
AL., EtRoPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (forthcoming 1992).
42. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
187. The currently effective text of the General Agreement can be found in volume IV of
GATT, BAsic INsTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DoCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter BISD].
43. For a brief, general overview of the GATT system and the issues under consideration
in the Uruguay Round, see WILLIAM J. DAVEY, An Overview of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, in PmRRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
1-75 (1991).
44. The general importance of dispute settlement mechanisms in trade agreements is
firmly recognized in U.S. law and policy. In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act,
the first of the "principal trade negotiating objectives" of the United States in international
trade negotiations was said to be "to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute
settlement mechanisms and procedures." The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101(b)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1)(A)
(1988)).
45. See generally William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 51 (1987).
1992] 1323
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provisions. The reading of the Appointments Clause urged by Mr. Morrison
would effectively prevent this.46 Fortunately, there is ample Supreme Court
precedent to support an alternative view of the Clause.
B. Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution
The foreign affairs of the United States are basically an exclusive federal
preserve. 47 Sovereignty, and hence foreign affairs powers, passed from
England to the American Colonies as a collective unit and not to the
individual states.48 Indeed, given Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, 49
there can be little doubt that the Framers intended the states to have little,
if any, role in conducting foreign affairs.
The conclusion that the foreign affairs of the United States are essen-
tially a federal concern has important ramifications. One would expect that
the United States Government to have the same sort of powers in foreign
affairs as the governments with which it deals. For example, Congress has
the power to regulate foreign commerce. 0 One would expect that this broad
grant of power, without express limitations, would allow the United States,
with the concurrence of the Congress and the President, to regulate foreign
commerce in the same manner as other sovereign states regulate it. Since
foreign commerce by its nature implies the involvement of another sovereign,
regulating it is often going to be done by international agreements. It would
be an odd constitution that gave exclusive power over foreign affairs and
commerce to a federal government, but then so limited its powers in that
field that it could not deal as an equal with other nations.
An instructive discussion of this issue in another context can be found
in the case of an entity that is not yet a complete sovereign-the European
Community (EC). Its member states have granted to the EC the exclusive
control of what is called the common commercial policy, which essentially
means trade relations with third countries. In a case questioning the EC's
46. I realize that Mr. Morrison limits his attack on international dispute settlement to
the specific provisions of Chapter 19 of the FTA, but I can envision his arguments being used
to attack international dispute settlement procedures more generally. For example, GATT
dispute settlement panels have found fault with U.S. administrative decisions applying U.S.
AD/CVD laws. See, e.g., Report of the GA TT Panel, United States-Countervailing Duties
on Fresh, Chilled an Frozen Pork from Canada, GATT Doc. DS7/R (July 11, 1991), BISD
38th Supp. at 30; P;CATORE ET AL., supra note 43, Case 83, at 591-96.
47. The acceptance of the exclusive federal role in foreign affairs should be distinguished
from the ongoing dispute over the relative roles of Congress and the President in the conduct
of U.S. foreign affairs. As to the latter, see generally HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: POWER SHARING AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (Yale Univ. Press
1990).
48. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-317 (1936). See
generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 5-9 (1868).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
... enter into any Agreement or Compact ... with a foreign Power ... ").
50. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations . . .").
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power to negotiate an international commodities agreement that dealt with
both trade and development issues, the EC Court of Justice commented as
follows:
[I]t is clear that a coherent commercial policy would no longer be
practicable if the Community were not in a position to exercise its
powers also in connexion with a category of agreements which are
becoming, alongside traditional commercial agreements, one of the
major factors in the regulation of international trade.
, It is therefore not possible to ... restrict the common
commercial policy to the use of instruments intended to have an
effect only on the traditional aspects of external trade to the
exclusion of more highly developed mechanisms .... A "commer-
cial policy" understood in that sense would be destined to become
nugatory in the course of time.
51
To cast this in U.S. terms, it would make no sense to say that Congress
can regulate foreign commerce 2 , but not in the way that the rest of world
is now regulating it. This is particularly the case given the broad interpre-
tation that the Supreme Court has typically given the Necessary and Proper
Clause."3
All of this is not to say that a constitution might not put specific
limitations on the ability of a government to engage in foreign affairs.
More importantly, it is not to say that certain general principles in one
nation's constitution might be given a greater prominence than in others,
such that they would limit the powers of the government in question to
take certain actions that other governments could take. The Bill of Rights
is a perfect example of this.5 4
Nonetheless, when there is no explicit control on the federal govern-
ment's conduct of foreigh affairs and no question of violation of basic
principles such as those contained in the Bill of Rights, it would seem
strange to me to insist on a hypertechnical reading of the Constitution to
undercut the nation's ability to deal on equal terms with other sovereign
states.
Not surprisingly, there is support in Supreme Court decisions for this
position. The most explicit support is in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.51 where the Court held that a delegation of power by Congress
to the President, which delegation might have been questionable under the
view of delegation then prevailing on the Court, was clearly permissible
51. Case 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, 2911-12,
3 C.M.L.R. 639, 676 (1979).
52. U.S. CoNs. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
53. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421-22 (1819) (discussing Congress' power with respect to national bank). "
54. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding right to speedy trial limited extension
of military jurisdiction overseas).
55. 299 U.S. 304, 315, 324 (1936); accord Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
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because of the foreign affairs aspect of the case. In other words, the Court
essentially took the position that the separation of powers doctrine could
and should be interpreted less strictly in a case involving foreign affairs.
Because the Appointments Clause arises out of the same doctrine, there is
authority for concluding that it too should be interpreted less strictly in the
foreign affairs context. Delegation, appointment and separation of powers
issues all relate to the internal division of power between the various
branches of the federal government, not to the power of the federal
government vis-&-vis other sovereign nations.
The proposition that constitutional provisions can be interpreted differ-
ently in the context of foreign affairs can be seen in other contexts as well.
For example, in Missouri v. Holland,6 the Court held that the United States
could enter into an international agreement with Canada that regulated
certain matters, specifically, migratory birds, even if those matters would
not be subject to regulation by Congress pursuant to a domestic federal
statute.
Somewhat analogously, the Supreme Court has applied a more rigorous
test to state restrictions discriminating against foreign commerce than it has
to state restrictions discriminating against interstate commerce. In Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,17 the Court struck down state taxation
rules that would have been upheld in the domestic U.S. context. In doing
so, it stated:
We may assume that, if the containers at issue here were instru-
mentalities of purely interstate commerce, Complete Auto would
apply and be satisfied, and our Commerce Clause inquiry would be
at an end. Appellants' containers, however, are instrumentalities of
foreign commerce .... The premise of appellees' argument is that
the Commerce Clause analysis is identical, regardless of whether
interstate or foreign commerce is involved. This premise, we have
concluded, must be rejected. When construing Congress' power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," a more extensive con-
stitutional inquiry is required. 8
Accordingly, there is ample precedent for a decision upholding the FTA
dispute settlement procedure even if in the domestic context it would present
an Appointments Clause problem.5 9
It must be stressed that this is not a domestic power struggle issue
between the Congress and the President. There is no concern in this case
56. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
57. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
58. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1979).
59. There is also a powerful argument in support of this result to be made from the
centuries of U.S. practice concerning international claims commissions. See Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (validating presidential power in Iranian claims settlements);
Hearings, supra note 21, at 384-404 (Appendix A to a memorandum on legal issues raised by
the FTA prepared for the International Trade Commission by Office of its General Counsel).
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about maintaining a balance of power struck by the Framers. Both the
Congress and the President are on the same side and have approved this
procedure. As a consequence, the case for judicial intrusion is at its
weakest.60 Indeed, if there is a balance of powers issue here, it is to ensure
ihat, given the fact that the states have no foreign affairs powers, the
federal government has sufficient power to conduct the foreign affairs of
the nation to its best advantage.
III. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
AND DEMOCRACY
Mr. Morrison's article makes one philosophical argument with which I
disagree and that is his position that Chapter 19 of the FTA "violates
principles of representative government and democracy." 6 He bases this
argument on the fact that under Chapter 19, private persons, the binational
panelists, may overrule decisions of federal officials.
I do not understand the connection between this fact and representative
democracy. Even if the President had entered into the FTA, and Chapter
19, without Congressional authorization or even acquiescence, his decision
to do so would have been made by the only person elected by all U.S.
citizens. In fact, the agreement was entered into with the overwhelming
support by Congress, as evidenced by its adoption of the Implementation
Act. The Senate adopted the Act by a vote of 83-9;62 the House of
Representatives by a vote of 366-40.63 Thus, this system was approved by
almost all elected federal officials. How can the fact that the system may
result in the reversal of a decision by some unelected federal official
undermine representative democracy?
Perhaps I am overstating my disbelief. The argument that U.S. trade
laws, and particularly the procedures for adopting trade agreements in
Congress, undermine representative democracy has become fashionable in
recent years. 4 I tend to view the "representative democracy" argument
somewhat cynically, as having less to do with democratic principles than
with a concern on the part of some special interest groups that their special
pleading may be sacrificed to the general public interest. For example, when
the issue of whether or not to approve a trade agreement is presented as a
package, special interest groups may fear that their concerns may seem too
parochial to persuade Congress to vote against an agreement that is in the
60. As Justice Jackson noted in an oft-quoted passage in a somewhat analogous situation:
"When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum .. " Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952); see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 653 (1981).
61. See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1299-1300.
62. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1,264 (1988).
63. Id. at 1,118.
64. See, e.g., WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1992, at A18 (advertisement sponsored, inter alia,
by Public Citizen, decrying "sneak attack on democracy" under.guise of free trade).
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overall national interest. Accordingly, they view these agreements as threat-
ening their interests. 6
I do not remember a "representative democracy" argument as having
been significant in the debates on the FTA's implementation. However,
there may have been some concern on the part of some users of U.S. AD/
CVD laws that in some cases binational panels would reach different
decisions than would the Court of International Trade and that the panel
decisions would tend to be less favorable to those seeking to restrict imports.
Accordingly, some users, or, at least, their lawyers,6 may have raised
constitutional objections to the FTA at least in part to try to prevent the
FTA from changing the impact of U.S. AD/CVD laws in a way that they
believed they could prevent if Congress were considering the AD/CVD laws
in isolation.
In any event, I view the argument about representative democracy as
being more about how special interests are treated than about whether
democratically elected representatives have exercised their best judgment in
approving a particular trade agreement. Viewed in that light, the "repre-
sentative democracy" argument offers no real counterweight to my argu-
ments in Part II that the constitutionality of arrangements like Chapter 19
should be upheld if at all possible. The United States must be able to
participate in the agreements regulating the global economy on an equal
basis with other nations. Indeed, our representative democracy truly would
be threatened if the citizens of this country could not have their elected
representatives in the Presidency and the Congress conduct a modern foreign
trade policy through conclusion of comprehensive foreign trade agreements
with other countries.67
65. This concern can be seen in a number of statements presented to Congress in
connection with extending the so-called fast track authority in 1991. The extension was
considered crucial for the continuation of negotiations in the Uruguay Round and on the
North America Free Trade Agreement. See generally PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
FAST TRACK TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY: HEAMNGS BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
66. At the House Judiciary Committee hearings, the principal opposition to Chapter 19
was advanced by Customs and International Trade Bar Association. At the outset of the
statement presented on their behalf, they questioned the advisability of "rescindling] the more
recently developed rights of U.S. industry and labor and consumer groups to [judicial] review
on important trade questions." Hearings, supra note 21, at 184, 185 (statement of Andrew P.
Vance). Since consumer groups have no such rights and labor unions seldom exercise them,
the opposition would seem to be based on a concern for U.S. industries that invoke these
laws.
67. It is worth noting that a powerful argument can be made that special interest groups
are ultimately the greatest threat to the U.S. system of government. See generally MANcUR
OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
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